European Identity and Its Changing Others by Neumann, Iver Brynild
No. 710 – 2006
Norsk 
Utenrikspolitisk 
Institutt
Norwegian Institute 
of International 
Affairs
[710] Paper
Iver B. Neumann
European Identity and Its
Changing Others
Utgiver: 
Copyright:
ISSN:
ISBN:
Besøksadresse:
Addresse:
Internett:
E-post:
Fax:
Tel:
NUPI
© Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt 2006
0800 - 0018
82 7002 143 1
Alle synspunkter står for forfatternes regning. De må ikke 
tolkes som uttrykk for oppfatninger som kan tillegges Norsk 
Utenrikspolitisk Institutt. Artiklene kan ikke reproduseres 
– helt eller delvis – ved trykking, fotokopiering eller på 
annen måte uten tillatelse fra forfatterne.
Any views expressed in this publication are those of the 
author. They should not be interpreted as reﬂecting the 
views of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. 
The text may not be printed in part or in full without the 
permission of the author.
C.J. Hambrosplass 2d
Postboks 8159 Dep. 
0033 Oslo 
www.nupi.no
pub@nupi.no
[+ 47] 22 36 21 82
[+ 47] 22 99 40 00
[Abstract] Taking its clue from Finnish experiences with identity politics, this lecture intro-
duces the concept of collective identity. Collective identity is about forging an acting ‘we’. 
It constitutes the polis, and is therefore basic to any politics. Constituting the polis is a rela-
tional act: the group in question constitutes itself by drawing up and maintaining boundaries 
towards other groups. Drawing on these insights, the bulk of the lecture discusses European 
identity in term of Europe’s relations to some of its constituting others. Pointing to the 
importance of not sealing itself off from its Muslim citizens and neighbours, the lecture ends 
with a plea for Turkish EU membership.
Iver B. Neumann
European Identity and Its
Changing Others
Based on a speech to the EU summit fringe conference ‘Constructing New Identities in Transform-
ing Europe: Enlargement and Integration: Are They Compatible?’, University of Helsinki, 5 October
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It is not only a great pleasure, but also somewhat intimidating to be invited 
to speak about European identities here in Finland. There are good reasons 
for that. Finland’s historical experience shines with successful identity-
building projects. Different political groups have had differing experiences 
with the importance of collective identity formation. The greater the number 
of other political groups that have been involved in a group’s own identity 
formation, the closer the relations with those other groups have been; and the 
more varied they have proven to be, the more well versed in the importance 
of identity formation that group has become.  
Finland is extremely well equipped with varied historical experiences that 
make for self-reflection. I am not thinking primarily about the country’s ex-
periences with national awakening in the 19th century and the relevance of 
Sweden and Russia here. Although these experiences were both important 
and intense, several other European nations have parallel histories in this 
regard.  
No, I am thinking about how the sovereign state of Finland has an unbro-
ken history of consciously linking identity projects to its foreign policy. It 
was present from the very start, in the country’s post-independence attempts 
to forge ties to other newly independent post-Russian empire states, the Bal-
tic States and Poland. When that did not work out, in 1923, Finland em-
barked on a prolonged and eminently successful identity project to become a 
Nordic country. It was there in Finland’s impressive effort to pay back loans 
to the United States – an effort that did much to consolidate the foundations 
for Finland’s Western identity. And it was of course there in Finland’s dash 
to join EFTA. Today, when Finland’s European identity has become so 
firmly established that no-one asks about history and credentials any more, it 
is perhaps only those of us who are professionally interested who can re-
member all the political acumen that was required for Finland to achieve 
EFTA membership. Moreover, as a precondition for Finland’s joining the 
EU, that EFTA membership should not be underestimated.  
Most recently, Finland’s tradition of being aware of the importance of 
identity-building paid off in 1994, when the entire country mobilised for EU 
membership. In 1993, I was involved in conducting some interviews in the 
foreign ministries along the Baltic rim, to check on preparations for the ensu-
ing wave of Europeanization.1 In Sweden, our questions about preparations 
                                                     
1 See Olav F. Knudsen & Iver B. Neumann (1995) Subregional Security Cooperation in the 
Baltic Sea Area. An Exploratory Study Oslo: NUPI-report no. 189. 
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were laughed at; the attitude was that Sweden would simply take EU mem-
bership in its stride. No need to worry about identity building and all that. In 
Finland, by contrast, everything was planned and prepared for down to a ‘t’. 
Diplomats – even those stationed abroad – had been briefed and trained, up 
and down, in and out, as to how the EU system worked. As a result, a pre-
pared Finland took to the Brussels-based politics of the EU like a duck takes 
to water. Not everybody did. Finland understands the importance of being in 
the thick of things, of coming across as belonging. So I feel that importing 
an outside, like myself, to speak to Finns about the political importance of 
identity is a bit like carrying coals to Newcastle. 
Moreover, Finland has successfully played its hand in the game of Euro-
pean identity formation. I was working as a policy planner in the Norwegian 
Foreign Ministry when Finland launched its Northern Dimension Initiative – 
and I clearly recall thinking that Norwegian diplomats were green with envy. 
Up until that initiative, Finland had done well enough with its Rovaniemi 
Process, but Norway felt that it was one step ahead with its Barents region-
building project. And then Finland used its newly acquired EU membership 
to lift the game up to a level where Norway as an outsider had no way of 
following. While Finland was playing the entire Northern field, including 
cities from St. Petersburg to Vilnius, Norway was left struggling in the icy 
Arctic backwaters.  
My final reason for feeling a bit out of place with this assignment con-
cerns the academic merits of Finns who have been working on identity for-
mation. Truly ground-breaking work has been done. In Geography, there is 
the work of people like Anssi Paasi, Pami Aalto and Sami Moisio. In Inter-
national Relations, there are figures like Pertti Joenniemi, Teija Tiilikainen 
and Vilho Harle. So why should I be standing here before you, given all the 
local expertise? In fact, the reason is intimately linked to the logic of identity 
formation. Every group needs an outside perspective to be recognized. Iden-
tity resides in the nexus between the in-group and the out-group, those who 
know how to do things and those who don’t, the civilized and the barbarians, 
the self and the other. In the final analysis, only the outsider can recognize 
and validate us. So, once again, my congratulations on all your past 
achievements. Their very existence establishes the importance of identity 
formation to politics. I should now like to focus on the nature of that impor-
tance, and on some challenges that lie ahead for European identity as such.  
Let us turn to Plato, and his dialogue The Statesman. Plato is interested in 
what it is that is specific to the work of the statesman, and by implication, to 
politics. His answer is that politics is the overarching or perhaps better un-
dergirding art of regulating the relationship between the one and the many. 
The polis, Plato suggests, is a web, a weave. The calling of the statesman is 
to finish this weave. The resultant cloth should be a perfect and all-inclusive 
mix of the bold and the prudent. Such a weave, such a political community, 
Plato concludes, would be the most shining one of them all.2 
                                                     
2 ’This then we declare to be the completion of the web of political action, which is created 
by a direct intertexture of the brave and temperate natures, whenever the royal science has 
drawn the two minds into communion with one another by unanimity and friendship, and 
having perfected the noblest and best of all the webs which political life admits, and en-
folding therein all other inhabitants of cities, whether slaves or freemen, binds them in 
one fabric and governs and presides over them, and, in so far as to be happy is vouchsafed 
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To Plato, then, politics concerns tying together the threads of personal 
fates into a weave where they are all complementary, joined in a community 
of practices and of fate. This is collective identity formation as seen from 
above. As seen from below, it is all about belonging and acting in accor-
dance with pre-existing scripts. We find this theme throughout the political 
theory canon. To the contract theorists, for example, people alienate their 
natural state in order to forge a community. Underlying all the questions of 
everyday politics, of what kind of constitution a community should have, 
how resources should be allocated etc. we find the basic question of who we 
are. Groups are key to human life. The larger they are, the more imperative 
to cohesion it is that there exists some kind of glue, some markers of com-
monness, some integration.  
It is impossible to act collectively without having some kind of precon-
ceived scheme of who is acting. This problem grows with the size of the 
group. Any workplace, for example, is rife with occasions where the idea 
and practices of commonality are repeated, over and over. Why – so that the 
employees should feel good? That too, for feeling commonality is one of the 
things that make most people feel good. But the key thing is that the feeling 
of commonality rests on a repertoire of knowledge about when and how to 
act together. It so happens that this knowledge is also a key part of produc-
tive power. It follows that a collective that knows itself to be a ‘we’ is sim-
ply more productive, with a larger capacity for action that it would have had 
if the we-feeling had been weaker.  So, as people have been pointing out 
since Plato, this we-feeling is a good thing all around. 
However, humans are not bees or ants. There exists no group-mind that 
can orchestrate the behaviour of each and every individual, so the group will 
necessarily be heterogeneous in some degree. This in turn means that much 
of the feeling of commonality will be imagined, not actually lived. Take the 
example of two people who love each other and decide to set up a common 
household. Let’s say that they are both Finns. Along comes December. Each 
of the two will have very clear ideas of what Christmas is. They will proba-
bly agree that they both know what a Finnish Christmas is, and how it should 
be celebrated. But what happens once they get into the details? Should we go 
to church? Should we have a Christmas tree? How should the tree be deco-
rated? Should we put the presents underneath? When are the presents to be 
opened? And what are we going to eat? When are we going to celebrate with 
your family, and with my family? You see where this is heading – when it 
comes right down to it, your partner knows nothing about what a real 
Christmas entails after all. She just thinks she knows, and you yourself were 
foolish enough to imagine that she would know. Close up, culture is not 
really shared. Even when we imagine that we share it, there are differences. 
Collective identity is furthered by the existence of common practices, but 
these practices are common in the sense that they are thought to be the same, 
not that they actually are the same. Collective identity is imagined – and it is 
no less real for that. After all, it hardly makes sense to chuck out your part-
ner just because she does not know how to celebrate Christmas. The partner-
                                                     
to a city, in no particular fails to secure their happiness.’ (Plato: The Statesman, transl. by 
Benjamin Jowett; online at http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/p/plato/ p71st/  
complete.html ) 
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ship continues, despite her abysmal ignorance as to the proper Finnish way 
to celebrate Christmas.   
Collective identities are also patchy. You may be a Finn even if you cele-
brate Orthodox Christmas 13 days late (as seen from the majority view-
point), if you don’t celebrate it at all (you are, perhaps, a Finnish Jehovah’s 
Witness), or even if you celebrate some other holiday concurrently (you are, 
say, a Finnish Jew). Collective identities are what social scientists call fuzzy 
sets or, following Ludwig Wittgenstein, family resemblances. There is no 
one physical or cultural trait that guarantees cultural similarity, say blonde 
hair or language competence. Being a member of a group is a case of know-
ing it when you see it, as social anthropologists say when they are pressed 
into a corner. 
Collective identities are also relational. Where some groups are con-
cerned, being a member of that group is compatible with being a member of 
another group, no questions asked. No one in their right mind would argue 
that it is not possible to be a male and a Finn at the same time, or a Finn and 
a Nordic. In the first case, the universe of identities (genders) is complemen-
tary; in the second case, the universe of identities (territorial political com-
munities) is nested.  In the case of territorial political communities, identities 
that are now obviously nested may not have been so in the past. Finnish 
Nordic-ness a hundred years ago is a case in point. So is the European-ness 
of, say, an EU country like Malta. As a Norwegian , I live with the question 
of possible compatibility between national identity and European identity 
every day. Prior to the referendum in 1994, vast numbers of pamphlets and 
leaflets were issued about Norway’s relationship to Europe. Most of them 
were kitted out with the Norwegian flag and the EU flag on the cover. The 
implication seemed to be that there was somehow a choice to be made be-
tween them: either the one, or the other. By contrast, in Helsinki, the Finnish 
and the EU flag may be flown side by side, signalling the compatibility and 
‘natural’ nestedness of the two entities. 
In the case of Norwegian and European identity, the relationship between 
them is highly contested. To many people, being Norwegian depends on 
maintaining a safe distance to the EU. The EU is what we may call a ‘consti-
tutive Other’ of Norwegian identity. All identities have their constitutive 
Others. You are a male because you are not a female, a female because you 
are not a male. The cultural infatuation with homosexuality, transvestism 
and  transsexualism is due, I would argue, to the way in which these prac-
tices remind us that something that we are told is preordained by nature is 
actually dependent on culture. Identities are culturally made. At the bounda-
ries of any collective identity, be it one of gender or one of territorial politi-
cal  community, there exists a continuous need to shore up and perpetuate 
that identity. Collective identities may be imagined and patchy, but since 
they are relational, there always exist other identities which confirm them by 
being different. Which these Others are, will vary within the group, and also 
historically. In the 1930s, a member of the Lappo movement and, say, a 
Swedish-speaking liberal living in Helsinki would have had different ideas 
about who the constitutive Others of Finnish identity were. Today, a German 
nationalist living in Hessen and a French Algerian-born liberal living in Paris 
will probably not see eye to eye on who the constitutive Others of European 
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identity are, either. But, by necessity, the constitutive Others will be there in 
some fashion – no inside without an outside, no in-group without out-groups. 
The point that collective identity is relational, that it is the group’s rela-
tions with other groups that sustain the group itself, is an old one. But in the 
decades following the Second World War, this insight was elaborated upon 
in ways which made it into the very cornerstone of social analysis of collec-
tive identity. Philosophers like Emmanuel Levinas, Simone de Beauvoir and 
Jacques Derrida did the theoretical groundwork. In terms of method, how-
ever, the breakthrough came within the social science that has specialised in 
identity since in its inception, namely social anthropology. In Bergen, in 
1969, Fredrik Barth and associates published Ethnic groups and boundaries, 
where the key point was that the maintenance of ethnic groups could be stud-
ied from the borders and inward, and specialized in terms of which differ-
ences the groups themselves saw as constituting them. From that point on-
wards, social anthropology never looked back; and over the past thirty-odd 
years, the other social sciences have followed suit. 
The point that identity could be studied along the boundaries has various 
implications for the way in which we think about European identity. First, it 
means that attempts to draw up a list of historic and social traits from some 
outside vantage point – that of the Christian theologian, for example, or that 
of the Western philosopher – have limited value. I would hold that it is im-
possible to find a cultural trait that is shared by all Europeans and not shared 
by any non-Europeans. It is, for example, true that the traditional costumes 
of most Europeans look about the same – but you find similar costumes 
elsewhere. It is true that there is a European food tradition, but it is internally 
split, you also find it elsewhere, and in Europe itself it lives side by side with 
other food traditions, such as the Turkish and Chinese ones. Similar points 
may be made for all other cultural traits.  
A second implication of the fact that identity is relational concerns the 
compatibility between European and national identities. The more similar 
the two kinds of identities are, the more averse the relation between them. 
The more different they are, the less chance that they will be activated at the 
same time, and the less chance of a clash between them. Here we have the 
reason why the European Commission’s attempts during the 1970s to build a 
‘European identity’ on the basis of a European flag, a European hymn etc. 
were so blatantly unsuccessful, and in fact probably counterproductive. This 
way of building identity had long since been cornered by nation states. 
Building a European identity by means of the same symbols in competition 
with national ones invited competition, with nation states being the home 
team. Not a good idea. 
A third implication of the relational nature of identity is that the size of 
cultural differences depends not on some inherent trait, but on how different 
they are perceived to be. Finnish and Swedish belong to two different lan-
guage families, whereas Swedish and Norwegian are linguistically very 
similar indeed. As identity markers, however, all three languages are equally 
good. To an outsider, the differences between Serb folk music and Croat folk 
music seem miniscule. To Serbs and Croats themselves, however, they are 
literally worlds apart – however close they may be musically, they are con-
stitutive of a difference of identity. This point – that it is the difference as 
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perceived by the group itself that is so central to cultural difference – has 
important bearings on European identity. It means, for example, that all the 
things which are similar between Europe and its neighbours may count for 
nothing if everyone involved insists on the differences, not the similarities. 
Take a key marker like religion. What does it help to point out that Islam and 
Christianity come in many varieties, that they are of common origin (‘we are 
all sons of Abraham’), that they share many structural similarities (monothe-
ism and patriarchy, to mention but two), if most people involved see religion 
as a razor-sharp divider? This is what makes people like Samuel Huntington, 
Osama bin Laden and Jean-Marie Le Pen so dangerous – not because they 
point to real differences, but because they insist that these differences should 
be constitutive of who we are, and central to social and political life. 
Speaking as a social anthropologist, I would say that the cultural bounda-
ries of Europe are decidedly fuzzy. As Sami Moisio has pointed out in a re-
cent article, if you look at your Euro currency notes, the authoritative map of 
Europe shown there is fuzzy at the boundaries, and rightly so.3 There are 
family resemblances between EU countries and their neighbours all around. 
Take the Eastern direction. It is impossible to draw a hard and fast line 
somewhere and say this is where Europe ends. The old Habsburgs used to 
insist that Asia started east of the Ringstrasse – the beltway circling Vienna. 
Balts and Rumanians will tell you that it starts across the river, in Ukraine. 
So will most Poles, if they are not of the expansive historical type that con-
sider themselves to be Jagiellonian Poles, of a kind with Ukrainians. In that 
case, they will tell you that Asia starts in Russia, as will most Ukrainians. 
Most Russians will, however, insist that Asia starts somewhere off to their 
East and South. 
In the southeastern corner of Europe, it is the same story. Austrians will 
tell you that Asia starts in Slovenia, Slovenes will point to Croatia, Croatians 
will point to Serbia, Serbs will point to Bosnia and Bosnians will point to 
Turkey. Most Greeks, and certainly Cypriots, will eagerly join in to support 
the idea that Europe stops at their doorstep. 
Head south, and you find a watered-down version of the same tendency – 
watered-down by the waters of the Mediterranean. Moroccans aspire to EU 
membership, and since being European is an explicit prerequisite, they have 
to play up their European side. They are in no doubt, however, about the 
non-European status of their neighbours further south. 
There are two quite different points to be made about this tendency al-
ways to elide Europe’s boundary with your own. The first one is that these 
arguments are very hard to sustain. I have yet to see, say, a Romanian case 
for Romania’s Europeanness and Ukraine’s non-Europeanness, or a Slovene 
case for Slovenia’s Europeanness and Croatia’s non-Europeanness that 
would stand an intellectual chance outside the nation state inside which it 
was hatched. Any outsider who has attended service in a Romanian Ortho-
dox and a Ukrainian Uniate Church, or who has eaten a Slovene and a Croa-
tian meal, will question why one of the two should be seen as more Euro-
pean than the other. But the other point is the exact opposite: if enough peo-
                                                     
3  Sami Moisio (2002) ’Rajat, identiteetti ja valta: laajentumisen poliittinen maantiede’. In 
Tapio Raunio &  Teija, Tiilikainen (eds.) Euroopan rajat. Laajentuva Euroopan unioni 
Helsinki: Gaudeamus. Thanks to Katri Pynnöniemi for translating. 
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ple adopt these differences as constitutive of Europe, then that becomes a 
social fact, and thereby self-fulfilling. This is about forging a ‘we’, this is 
identity politics at work, and the stakes are high.    
If Europe’s relationships to its Others is constitutive of its identity, a tour 
d’horizon of them all should tell us something about the present state of 
European identity. Such a journey confronts us with an immediate problem, 
however, and it has to do with the lay of the land. Europe’s identity is tied to 
Europe’s relations not only to its neighbours, but also to more far-flung 
powers. Furthermore, there are other kinds of relationships that are also 
highly important. Take Europe’s relationship to its own past. To some peo-
ple, European identity is all about Christianity, so the Middle Ages present 
themselves as a particularly illustrious period. To others, the European heri-
tage has to do with the triumph of secularism over faith, so Enlightenment 
thinking is the cornerstone and intellectual life in the Age of Enlightenment 
an ideal.  
To the east, there is Russia. Russia and Europe have a continuous history 
of some 350 years in which both parties have debated their degree of famili-
arity. They are still at it. At present, I would argue, the key theme of this 
conversation concerns the role of the state. In Europe, sovereignty has been 
pooled, and universalist standards of various kinds are making ever larger 
encroachments on politics. Human rights, yes – but here I am thinking first 
and foremost about state–society relations. In Europe, the state is stepping 
back, not necessarily in the sense that it becomes less important, but in the 
sense of delegating more and more to other bodies, and to its citizens. We 
are seeing a turn towards indirect rule, orchestrated by the state.  
Not so in Russia, where the state is in the ascent, and the tendency for it 
is to rule more things more directly. If a societal venture proves too success-
ful, it gets closed down. We recall the case of Yukos, of the NGO legislation 
passed last January, of the state’s attacks on religious groups other than the 
Russian Orthodox Church. In terms of European identity politics, this is a 
situation where pluralism and some kind of generalized liberalism are be-
come increasingly central to European identity, with Russia opting for what 
looks to Europeans like old-fashioned state building. As a result, Russia is 
out of synch with the development of European identity. For example, I pub-
lished an article in the Russian daily Kommersant a few months ago. People 
were not pleased, but I did not hear any intellectual counter-arguments. 
We all know how, during the 1990s, countries from Estonia in the north 
to Slovenia in the south made considerable efforts to join the European Un-
ion. There are two very clear lessons here for other countries of the region. 
First, concurring with the Copenhagen criteria will take you not only a long 
way, but all the way. It is possible to succeed, and succeed fairly quickly. 
Secondly, and here I beg to differ with Abraham Lincoln, you may fool 
some of the people some of the time, but you can’t fool all of the people all 
of the time. You may get an extension on implementing a policy here and 
you may get the Commission to turn a blind eye to some specific patch of 
politics there, but in the end there is no alternative to actually doing the nec-
essary social and political work. The experience of European oddments like 
Norway and Switzerland points in the same direction – it is all about follow-
ing and hanging on. European identity may be socially decentred, but when 
Iver B. Neumann 12 
it comes to politics, there is definitely a centre. Furthermore, the Brussels-
centred politics of European integration is giving shape to more and more of 
European political life generally. In every single country of Europe, whether 
EU member country or not, the dividing line of increasing importance is to 
what degree that country should immerse itself. This, I feel, is far more im-
portant than which percentage of the electorate happens to vote which way 
on questions like adopting the Euro or adopting an EU Constitution The 
agenda of politics has become a European agenda. That, I would argue, is 
more important than the question of the pace of integration.  
The one thing that may reverse this trend is not resistance to further inte-
gration. Certainly, that may slow down the pace of integration and halt its 
spread to new areas of social life. But it would not by itself undermine the 
central role of Brussels-based politics. The one thing that may have that ef-
fect is if political life in European countries should evolve their own agen-
das, agendas that are not so much opposed to hegemonic Brussels-based 
politics, as simply of another kind. The only country where I can see the stir-
rings of such a development is Serbia. Its recent political history should also 
serve as a sobering reminder of what such a non-Brussels oriented politics 
might come to look like. Even in Serbia, however, we are talking about a 
minority position. In general, political life in Eastern Europe and the Balkans 
are a tonic to European identity; by wanting so very much to join in, they 
underwrite the validity of the European political project. 
In my view, the key issues for European identity today do not have to do 
with Russia, which for the time being has decided to keep its distance, or 
with Eastern Europe and the Balkans, which on the contrary want to cut 
down the distances. No, these issues concern the intertwined questions of the 
United States and of Turkey. 
The importance of the United States to global politics today can hardly be 
overestimated. There is not a political issue area or a political conflict that 
may be adequately understood without taking that country into the equation. 
The relationship to the USA plays an important role in the formation of 
every single political community of any scale, anywhere on the globe. As 
spelled out in such documents as the Quadrennial Defence Review, the long-
term (25–30 years) goal of the United States is to block the emergence of 
possible competitors. We all know the short-term goal: it is to win what used 
to be known as the ‘war on terror’. We also know the means and the doctrine 
that Washington brings to this task. The means are military – unilateral when 
needed, multilateral if convenient. The doctrine is one of identity politics, as 
well tested by a string of morally dubious regimes on numerous historical 
occasions. To quote (among others) President George W. Bush, who is not 
with us, is against us. 
This forward-leaning and Manichean policy has been standing in direct 
opposition to European politics for five years now. Even in Britain, the 
USA’s closest European ally for decades, opposition has been so strong as to 
bring about the downfall of the prime minister. There is a clash of world-
views here. The United States has long favoured a more direct way of deal-
ing with adversaries – and here I do not mean only its propensity for large-
scale, all-out military operations aimed at unconditional surrender of the 
other party. We find the same propensity to employ physical force in uphold-
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ing social order on other levels of American life. To take but one example, 
according to official US sources, more than four million Americans are cur-
rently under some kind of surveillance, with more than two million of them 
being incarcerated.4 
There are two reasons why the relationship to the United States will be 
pivotal for European identity in the foreseeable future. The first is the un-
questioned and overwhelming importance of US military and political power 
in the years to come for all the rest of the globe, Europe included. The sec-
ond is that the United States has come to constitute a model for how to live, 
a model that in several key aspects stands in direct opposition to the Euro-
pean way of life. There is no need to give an interplanetary explanation for 
this as some have tried to do (‘Europeans are from Venus, Americans are 
from Mars’). The long and short of it is that the United States, due to its ex-
perience as an immigrant nation, has evolved a way of looking at the rest of 
the world in terms of how ripe they are for adopting the only possible model, 
namely the American Way of Life. Resistance to this is interpreted as a hos-
tile act. And, naturally enough, such an imperialistic attitude cannot fail to 
evoke resistance, particularly from those of us who feel commitment to some 
other and rivalling political community, for example the European one. 
European identity will be tested in the years to come, not least by the grow-
ing American imperialism. Empires have always sought to divide in order to 
rule – and, as seen not least in the campaign to establish itself in what US 
leaders have referred to somewhat incongruously as ‘new Europe’, the 
American empire is no different. 
It is tempting to assail the United States on its hostility to other groups, 
and particularly to Muslims. While it would be easy to launch such an attack 
– President Bush has, for example, evoked an important heritage of hostility 
by pronouncing that his ‘war on terror’ is a crusade for civilization – it 
would not be fair to launch such an attack in this context. There are two rea-
sons for this. First, as already noted, the US experience with immigration is a 
rather lustrous one. It is true that the American system has produced collec-
tive failure for certain groups, and has kept them in grotesquely unprivileged 
positions. To take but one example, more than half of the black male popula-
tion between 18 and 34 have been or are under surveillance.5 But it is also 
true that for each such group, the American experience includes several 
other successful cases of integration. The second reason why US policy to-
wards the Muslim world should not be attacked in connection with talking 
about European identity is that Europe’s own record hardly warrants a ho-
lier-than-thou attitude. There are in Europe millions of Muslims – due to the 
secular way some states keep their records, and to illegal immigration, no 
one knows quite how many there are. One thing is clear: they are hardly well 
integrated. Furthermore, Europe’s policy towards the fuzzy collective iden-
tity called the Ummah, the community of Muslim believers, is not exactly 
clear and constructive.  
There exists a political issue which offers itself as a test of European 
goodwill towards the Muslim world, a test of its willingness to overcome the 
                                                     
4 According to the Federal Bureau of Statistics; for details about prisons, see 
http://www.bop.gov/ 
5 See http://www.bop.gov/ 
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historical heritage of hatred and its ability to prove its commitment to plural-
ism. This is the issue of Turkish EU membership. Turkey has been standing 
in the queue for almost 40 years. Millions of Turks are already living and 
working in Europe. Most importantly, Turkey has undertaken fundamental 
political and social work in order to develop the compatibility needed to join. 
True, there remain many outstanding issues. They are real enough, and as 
was the case with the EU’s Eastern enlargement, Turkey should not and will 
not be able to get away with policies that are too blatantly contradictory to 
the Copenhagen criteria. Turkey would, for example, be a long step closer to 
fulfilling the criterion of good-neighbourly relations if it came clean on its 
dirty deeds against the Armenians around 1915. But, as noted above, humans 
are not ants, and collective identities are not homogeneous. Turkey will re-
main different in some regards, and so it should –  that is no reason why it 
should not be welcomed in the EU. This would, not least, send a much-
needed signal to the rest of Europe’s neighbours – and here we find countries 
with young, sizeable and growing populations like Egypt – that putting your 
own house in order can have its rewards in terms of your relationship to 
Europe.  
The theme of this conference has been ‘Constructing New Identities in 
Transforming Europe: Enlargement and Integration: Are They Compatible?’. 
Nested within European identity we find whole swathes of other identities, 
each with their Others, each with their dynamism, each with their potential 
to change European identity as such. Here I have chosen to focus on the 
Others along the geographical boundaries.  
Let me end with a key point in this regard. There is a trade-of between in-
tegration and exclusion. Every time something or someone is included, 
something is excluded. Since who we are is dependent on what is on the out-
side of us and what kind of relationships we have to that outside, this cannot 
be helped.  But exclusion is a matter of degree. When we, and particularly 
the statesmen amongst us, weave the web of Europe, it is imperative that we 
leave the ends of the threads dangling. Collective identities do not stand still 
for their picture. They are forever unfinished, in content as well as in social 
and geographical reach. Therefore, we should be open to those who seek our 
company, and compensate for the broader challenges of a larger and more 
diverse membership by continuing to strengthen Europe’s common institu-
tions as the undertaking grows – just as we have done with each enlargement 
of the European Union thus far. 
 
 
